Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare by Tarasov, Alexander
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Income Distribution, Market Structure,
and Individual Welfare
Alexander Tarasov
March 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8250/
MPRA Paper No. 8250, posted 13. April 2008 00:28 UTC
Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare
Alexander Tarasovy
The Pennsylvania State University
April 2008
Abstract
This paper explores how income distribution inuences market structure and a¤ects the eco-
nomic well-being of di¤erent groups. It shows that inequality may be good for the poor via a
trickle-down e¤ect operating through entry. I consider a general equilibrium model of monop-
olistic competition with free entry, heterogenous rms and consumers that share identical but
non-homothetic preferences. The general model is solved. The case of two types of consumers, rich
and poor, is considered in detail. I show that higher income inequality in the economy can benet
the poor. An increase in personal income of the rich raises welfare of the poor, while an increase in
the fraction of the rich has an ambiguous impact on the poor: welfare of the poor has an inverted U
shape as a function of the fraction of the rich. At the same time, an increase in the personal income
of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the rich, keeping the aggregate income in the
economy xed, raises the well-being of the poor. I also analyze the e¤ect of changes in market size
and entry cost. I show that the rich gain more from an increase in market size and lose more from
an increase in the cost of entry than the poor.
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1 Introduction
What are the possible consequences of income redistribution for market structure, consumption allo-
cation, and welfare? As Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000) argue, "it is di¢ cult to think of economic
issues without distributive consequences and it is equally di¢ cult to imagine distributive problems
without some allocational dimension." There is a large empirical and theoretical literature that relates
income distribution and inequality to a number of social and economic outcomes1. Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) show that an increase in income inequality has a negative impact on economic growth (see also
Persson and Tabellini (1994)). Waldmann (1992) argues that the level of inequality is positively corre-
lated with infant mortality. Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003) suggest that high inequality can
negatively a¤ect social and economic progress through the subversion of institutions in the economy.
This paper develops another insight into the interaction between income distribution and economic
outcomes, which has not been explored extensively. I examine how income distribution a¤ects market
structure, pricing, and the welfare of heterogenous agents. In particular, I show that higher income
inequality in the economy may benet the poor via a trickle-down e¤ect operating through entry.
I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous rms and
consumers. In traditional models of monopolistic competition, income distribution plays no role. This
rests on two standard preference assumptions. First, if preferences are identical and homothetic, it is
well understood that the distribution of income does not a¤ect equilibrium: only aggregate income
matters. Second, when preferences are quasi-linear, the presence of a numeraire good eliminates the
inuence of income distribution on equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, I assume that all consumers
share identical but non-homothetic preferences. I introduce income heterogeneity in the model by
assuming that consumers di¤er in the e¢ ciency units of labor they are endowed with. In models with
identical homothetic preferences, any price changes have the same impact on all consumers regardless of
whether consumers are identical or not. Non-homothetic preferences and income heterogeneity imply
that changes in prices may a¤ect di¤erent groups di¤erently. In the model, the presence of market
power induces variable markups across rms, which are in turn a¤ected by income distribution. Hence,
changes in income distribution may have di¤erent consequences for di¤erent groups of agents.
I adopt the preference structure from Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Matsuyama (2000).
The basic idea is that goods are indivisible and potential consumers want to buy only one unit of each
good. This implies that given prices, goods can be arranged so that consumers can be seen as moving
down some list in choosing what to buy. For instance, in developing countries, consumers rst buy
food, then clothing, then move up the chain of durables from kerosene stoves to refrigerators, to cars.
1See Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000) for more substantial literature review.
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Notice that the consumer utility can only be increased by the consumption of a greater number of
goods. Moreover, higher income consumers consume the same set of goods as lower income consumers
plus some others. This structure of consumer preferences has enough exibility to be applied as to the
whole economy as to a certain industry where goods di¤er in quality. On the one hand, each good can
be interpreted as a distinct good sold in the market. In this case, the structure describes the whole
economy. On the other hand, we might think that rms sell not distinct goods but some characteristics
of a good produced in a certain industry. For instance, consider a car industry. Each good can be
treated as some characteristic of a car. The poor purchase main characteristics associated with a car,
while the rich buy the same characteristics as the poor plus some additional luxury characteristics.
That is, both groups of consumers buy the same good but of di¤erent quality.
Goods di¤er in terms of the valuations consumers attach to them. By the valuation of a certain
good, I mean the utility delivered to consumers from the consumption of one unit of this good. That
is, there are goods that are more essential in consumption (necessities) and goods that are less essential
(luxuries). There is free entry in the market. To enter the market, ex ante identical rms have to
make costly investments that are sunk. Once rms enter, they learn about the valuations attached
to their goods. The only source of rm ex-post heterogeneity is the di¤erence in the valuations
placed on their goods2. Depending on the valuations drawn, rms choose whether to stay or to leave
the market. Firms that decide to stay engage in price competition with other rms. This and the
preference structure lead to the endogenous distribution of markups, which is inuenced not only by
market size, but also by the distribution of income in the economy. Hence, the model incorporates
two key features: imperfect competition and non-homothetic preferences, which allow analyzing the
consequences of changes in the income distribution on pricing in the equilibrium, the market structure
and, thereby, welfare of di¤erent groups of consumers.
While the general model is established and solved, the heart of the paper focuses on the case of two
types of consumers: rich and poor3. Depending on the valuations attached to the goods they produce,
rms are endogenously divided into three groups in the equilibrium. Firms with high valuations choose
to serve all consumers. Firms with medium valuations decide to sell only to the rich. Finally, rms
with low valuations leave the market. Therefore, the poor consume on average more essential goods
than the rich. This is in line with common intuition that the rich spend higher share of their income
on luxury goods, which are less essential in consumption4.
2To simplify the analysis, I assume that the marginal cost of production is identical across all rms.
3Recall that in the model, income distribution is exogenous. I deliberately leave out of the scope the situation when
income distribution is endogenous, since my main goal is to understand the e¤ects of changes in income distribution not
in some other parameters.
4Notice that the present model is not a model about quality di¤erences. Agents do not choose between high quality
and low quality potatoes. They choose between potatoes, TVs, refrigerators, and so on.
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As sources of income inequality, I consider changes in the income and the fraction of the rich
consumers. An increase in the income level of the rich has two e¤ects: redistribution of rms across
the groups and the higher number of rms entering the market, which results in tougher competition.
The former e¤ect is negative for the poor, while the latter one is positive. I show that due to additional
entry, the poor gain from an increase in the income of the rich. This is reminiscent of the trickle-down
e¤ect in Aghion and Bolton (1997), who show that in the presence of imperfect capital markets, the
accumulation of wealth by the rich may be good for the poor. The intuition, which is behind these
results, may also work in traditional models with homothetic preferences. In Melitz (2003), higher
income of some consumers results in higher entry, tougher competition, and, thereby, higher welfare
of all consumers. However, there are some di¤erences. In the short run, when the mass of rms is
unchanged, there is only a negative impact on the poor resulting in welfare losses. In traditional
models, if we x the mass of rms then higher income of one part of consumers does not a¤ect welfare
of the other part. Moreover, in the present model higher income of the rich raises the markups of
rms selling only to the rich and decreases the markups of rms serving all consumers. In traditional
models, there is the same or no impact on rmsmarkups.
Another intriguing issue is to compare welfare of the poor in economies with di¤erent fractions of
the rich. What is better for the poor: tiny minority or vast majority of the rich? Keeping the same
personal incomes and the mass of the consumers, an increase in the fraction of the rich has two opposite
implications for the poor. First, some rms that served all consumers choose to sell only to the rich.
Second, the larger fraction of the rich results in more rms entering the market. The former e¤ect
hurts the poor and the latter one benets them. I show that if the fraction of the rich is small then
the positive e¤ect prevails, while if the fraction of the rich is su¢ ciently high the opposite happens.
Hence, we might expect that welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a function of the fraction
of the rich. The fact that rms endogenously choose the type of consumers they wish to serve makes
the results regarding changes in fraction of the rich di¤erent from that ones in traditional models with
homothetic preferences. In Melitz (2003), higher fraction of the rich always leads to higher welfare of
the poor in the long run and has no impact in the short run. In the present model, we observe an
ambiguous impact in the long run and a negative impact in the short run. There is a common feature
of both comparative statics considered above. An increase in the personal income of the rich as well
as an increase in the fraction of the rich raises the aggregate income in the economy. In the view of
policy implications, we need to explore the e¤ects of changes in income distribution keeping aggregate
income constant. To capture a pure redistribution e¤ect, I consider an increase in the personal income
of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the rich keeping aggregate income in the economy
xed. In models with homothetic preferences, these changes in income distribution do not a¤ect entry,
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prices, and welfare of the poor. In the present model, I show that they result in higher entry in the
market. This in turn leads to higher welfare of the poor.
The e¤ects of changes in entry cost or market size on consumer welfare are similar to those in
traditional literature. However, consumers do not equally gain or lose from these changes as we might
expect in models with homothetic preferences. Who gains more: the rich or the poor? I show that
given some plausible assumption about the distribution function of valuation draws, the rich gain more
from a rise in market size and lose more from a rise in entry cost than the poor.
The related literature in this area can be divided into three strands. First, there are papers that
consider monopolistic competition models with rm heterogeneity assuming homothetic or quasi-linear
preferences. Melitz (2003) develops a general equilibrium model with rm heterogeneity and Dixit-
Stiglitz preferences, which imply constant markups. Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) examine a similar
framework, but incorporate variable markups considering a linear demand system. However, in both
these papers, the distribution of income does not play any role. In contrast, the model presented here
includes all the key features of the papers mentioned while also establishing a connection between
income distribution and the market structure. The second group of papers, for instance Flam and
Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), and Matsuyama (2000), explores the implications of non-homothetic
preferences in a perfectly competitive environment for open economies. These papers mainly analyze
the interaction between income distribution and trade patterns. There is a set of papers written
by Krishna and Yavas5, in which the role of indivisibilities and market distortions is investigated.
However, the impact of income distribution on market structure is not considered in these papers.
Finally, the third group of papers deals with both monopolistic competition and non-homothetic pref-
erences. Markusen (1986) extends the Krugman type model of trade with monopolistic competition
by adding non-homothetic demand. He examines the role of income per capita in interindustry and
intra-industry trade. Mitra and Trindade (2005) also consider a model of monopolistic competition
with non-homothetic preferences. However, the way they introduce nonhomotheticity has a shortcom-
ing: the share of consumer income spent on a certain type of goods is exogenous and depends on the
income.
Closer to this paper is the work of Foellmi and Zweimueller (2004) that develops a general equi-
librium model with an exogenous mass of identical rms. In contrast, I consider heterogenous rms
and free entry in the market, which in turn implies endogeneity of the mass of potential producers
in equilibrium. Moreover, Foellmi and Zweimueller (2004) do not address welfare issues. They show
that, depending on the parameters of the model, an increase in income inequality has either no impact
on rm markups or increases them. The present paper suggests that this is not necessarily the case; in
5See Krishna and Yavas (2001), Krishna and Yavas (2004), and Krishna and Yavas (2005).
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fact, an increase in income inequality a¤ects di¤erent rms di¤erently. Due to free entry, greater in-
come inequality may raise markups for rms that sell their goods only to the rich and reduce markups
for rms that sell their goods to all consumers. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) study how in-
come inequality a¤ects the adoption of modern technologies. In their model, prices and markups are
exogenous. In fact, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) leave the questions of competition, markups,
and welfare outside their analysis. In the paper closest to the present work, Foellmi and Zweimueller
(2006) examine a dynamic variation of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). Assuming learning by
R&D, they focus their analysis on the link between possible growth and inequality. In contrast, I
do not consider the learning by R&D spillover and explore the impact of income distribution and
inequality on the level of competition, markups, and individual welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic concepts of the general
model. Section 3 develops a special case with two types of consumers, rich and poor, and establishes
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for this case. It also derives the implications of the distribution
of income on market structure and individual welfare. Section 4 extends the analysis to the general
case with N types of consumers, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous rms and con-
sumers. The preference structure is adopted from Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Matsuyama
(2000).
2.1 Production
The timing of the model is as follows. There is free entry in the market. To enter the market, rms
have to make sunk investments fe. If a rm incurs the cost of entry, it obtains a draw b of the valuation
of its good from a common distribution G(b) on [0; A]. This is meant to capture the idea that before
they enter, rms do not know how well they will end up doing, as they do not know how highly
consumers will value their products. I assume that G0(b) = g(b) exists. The valuation b is interpreted
as the utility delivered to consumers from the consumption of one unit of the good. Depending on the
valuation they draw, rms choose to leave the market or to stay. Firms that decide to stay compete
in price with other rms. The only factor of production is labor. I assume that marginal costs of
production are the same for all rms and equal to c, i.e., it takes c e¤ective units of labor (which are
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paid a wage of unity6) to produce a unit of any good7.
Consumers di¤er in the number of e¢ ciency units of labor they are endowed with8. I assume that
there are N types of consumers indexed by n: A consumer of type n is endowed with In e¢ ciency
units of labor. I choose indices so that In > In 1. Let n be the fraction of type n consumers in the
aggregate mass L of consumers. Then, the total labor supply in the economy in e¢ ciency units is
L
PN
i=1 iIi:
2.2 Consumption
All consumers have the same non-homothetic preferences given by utility function
U =
Z
!2

b(!)x(!)d!,
where 
 is the set of available goods in the economy, b(!) is the valuation of good !, and x(!) 2 f0; 1g
is the consumption of good !: Each consumer owns a balanced portfolio of shares of all rms. Due
to free entry, the total prots of all rms are equal to zero in the equilibrium. This implies that the
value of any balanced portfolio is equal to zero. Thus, all consumers have the same wealth, while their
incomes vary with their productivity. To simplify the notation, I assume that consumers have equal
shares of all rms. Let  be the total prot of all rms in the economy. Given prices of available
goods, a type n consumer maximizes Z
!2

b(!)x(!)d!
subject to the budget constraint Z
!2

p(!)x(!)d!  In + 
L
;
where p(!) is the price of good !. The utility maximization merely involves moving down the list of
products ordered by their valuation to price ratios, b(!)p(!) , until all income is exhausted.
The analysis of the general case with N types is rather complicated. Therefore, I focus the analysis
on the simpler case when consumers have one of two possible labor productivities. In the next section,
I show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and analyze its properties. In section 4, I prove
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the general case and briey discuss the case when
the distribution of labor productivities is continuous.
6 In the model, wage is taken as numeraire.
7The assumption that marginal costs of production are the same across rms simplies analytical derivations in the
model and does not change qualitative results. In general, we can assume that marginal costs are also drawn from some
common distribution.
8Throughout the paper, I use terms, endowments of e¢ ciency units of labor and labor productivities, interchangeably.
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3 A Special Case: Two Types of Consumers
There are two types of consumers: a high income (high productivity) type and a low income type.
The productivity of the high income type is dened by IH , the productivity of the low income type
is IL. Given the preferences, all goods consumed by less productive consumers are also consumed by
more productive. Thus, goods in the economy can be divided into three groups: the "common" group
includes goods that are consumed by all consumers; the "exclusive" group includes goods that are
only consumed by high income consumers; nally, there is the group of goods that are consumed by
no one.
A rm that produces a good ! obtains the prot of (p(!)   c)Q(!), where Q(!) is demand for
good !. If all consumers buy the good then the demand is L: If only the rich buy it, the demand is
HL, where H is the fraction of a high income type. Hence, Q(!) 2 fL;HL; 0g. Each rm takes the
valuation to price ratio of all other rms as given and maximizes its prot. The following proposition
holds.
Proposition 1 Even though all goods have di¤erent valuation to marginal cost ratios, goods from the
same group have the same valuation to price ratio in the equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose not. In this case, there exists some group, in which there are at least two goods with
di¤erent b(!)p(!) ratios. Since both goods belong to the same group, the rm that produces its good with
higher b(!)p(!) can raise its p(!) without a¤ecting the demand. This in turn would increase its prot.
Dene VC as the valuation to price ratio of goods from the "common" group and VE as valuation
to price ratio of goods from the "exclusive" group in the equilibrium. Here VC and VE are endogenous
parameters and VC is strictly greater than VE9. Thus, if a rm with valuation b(!) sells to all consumers
then its price is equal to b(!)VC and its prot is given by
(p(!)  c)L =

b(!)
VC
  c

L,
while if the rm sells only to the rich, its prot is given by
(p(!)  c)HL =

b(!)
VE
  c

HL:
As VC > VE , the rm chooses between selling to more people at a lower price and selling to fewer
of them but at a higher price. Hence, the rm chooses p(!) 2 f b(!)VC ;
b(!)
VE
g to maximize its prot,
9Notice that by denition, VC  VE . If VC = VE then all available goods have the same valuation to price ratios.
In this case, the equilibrium concept implies that the high income consumers buy all goods, while the poor buy only
some part (for instance, this part can be randomly determined). This means that expected demand for a certain good
is strictly less than L. Thus, rms can increase their prots by slightly decreasing their prices and acquiring greater
demand share. Therefore, if VC = VE , equilibrium does not exist.
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Figure 1: The Prot Function
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taking VC and VE as given. In the equilibrium, the price of good ! only depends on b(!). Therefore,
hereafter I omit the notation of ! and consider prices as a function of b.
Let bM be the unique solution of the equation
b
VC
  c

L =

b
VE
  c

HL: (1)
In the equilibrium, the condition HVE <
1
VC
is satised. Otherwise, for any b  0,

b
VE
  c

HL >
b
VC
  c

L and all rms would choose to sell only to high income consumers. However, this is impos-
sible in the equilibrium. This condition guarantees that
b
VC
  c

L 

b
VE
  c

HL if b  bM ,
b
VC
  c

L <

b
VE
  c

HL otherwise.
This means that if a rm draws b  bM then in the equilibrium, it sells to both types of consumers,
otherwise it sells only to the rich or exits. A rm with valuation bM of its good is indi¤erent between
selling to all consumers and selling only to the rich (see Figure 1 ). Hence, even in the presence of
market power, products have a natural hierarchy: consumers rst buy goods with higher b, i.e., goods
that are more essential in consumption. This result is supportive of the common intuition that the
poor mostly spend their incomes on necessities, which are more essential in consumption, while the
rich can a¤ord to buy not only necessities but also luxuries. Without loss of generality, I assume that a
rm with valuation bM sells to both types of consumers. Let a function V (b) be dened by bp(b) . In the
equilibrium, V (b) looks as in Figure 2, where bL  0 is a cuto¤ level such that rms drawn b < bL exit.
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Figure 2: The Valuation to Price Function: A Special Case
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VE
VC
0
V (b)
bbL bM A
3.1 The Equilibrium
Let Me be the mass of rms that enter the market. One can think of Me as that there are Meg(b)
di¤erent rms with a particular valuation b. In the equilibrium, several conditions should be satised.
First, as there is free entry in the market, the ex ante expected prots of rms have to be equal to
zero. Second, the goods market clears. Since the poor consume only goods from the "common" group,
the aggregate cost of the bundle of goods from the "common" group should be equal to the income
of a poor consumer. Similarly, the aggregate cost of the bundle of all available goods in the economy
should be equal to the income of a rich consumer.
Denition 1 The equilibrium of the model is dened by the price function p(b) on b  bL, the cuto¤
level bL  0, bM , Me; and the valuation to price ratios VC and VE such that
1) The ex ante expected prots of rms are equal to zero.
2) The goods market clears.
Further, I derive equations that satisfy the conditions mentioned above and prove that equilibrium
in the model always exists and is unique. Let (b) be the variable prot of a rm with valuation b. To
nd the equilibrium, I express (b) and p(b) as functions of b; bL, bM and exogenous parameters. As
bL is the cuto¤ level, rms with valuation bL have zero prots. This implies that

bL
VE
  c

HL = 0
or VE =
bL
c . From (1), we can express VC as a function of bL and bM : As a result, the following lemma
holds.
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Figure 3: The Price Function
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Lemma 1 In the equilibrium,
p(b) =
(
b
VC
= cb

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

if b  bM ,
b
VE
= cb 1bL if b 2 [bL; bM ),
(b) =
8<:

cb

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

  c

L if b  bM ,
cb 1bL   c

HL if b 2 [bL; bM ):
Since rms with valuation bM have the same prots from selling to all consumers as from selling
only to the rich, the price function has a jump at bM ; i.e., to compensate for lower demand, rms raise
their prices (see Figure 3 ). This results in the nonmonotonicity of the price function.
Due to free entry in the market, the ex ante expected prots of rms are equal to zero in the
equilibrium. Using the results from Lemma 1 and taking into account that rms with b < bL exit, I
obtain
fe = (G(bM ) G(bL))E((b)jbL  b < bM ) + (1 G(bM ))E((b)jb  bM ) ()
fe
cL
+ 1 = HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM ), (2)
where H(x) = G(x) +
RA
x xdG(x)
x : The goods market clearing condition implies that
IL =Me
R A
bM
p(t)dG(t)
IH =Me
R A
bL
p(t)dG(t)
: (3)
The aggregate cost of the bundle of goods from the "common" group is equal to the income of a poor
consumer, while the aggregate cost of the bundle of all available goods in the economy is equal to
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the income of a rich consumer. Dividing the second line in (3) by the rst one and using Lemma 1, I
obtain R bM
bL
tdG(t)R A
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

:
Hence, given the exogenous parameters IH ; IL; H ; fe; c; L; and the distribution of draws G(), we
can nd endogenous bM and bL from the system of equations, which is given by
R bMbL tdG(t)RA
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

fe
cL + 1 = HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM )
: (4)
The following lemma states the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Lemma 2 The system of equations (4) has a unique solution.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Once bM and bL are found, VC and VE can be derived using the results in Lemma 1. Finally, the
mass of rms can be found from (3) :
3.2 Income Inequality and Welfare
Before analyzing the e¤ects of income inequality on market structure and welfare, I examine how
consumer welfare and income inequality are determined in the model.
3.2.1 Welfare
Given the preference structure, welfare of a certain consumer is equal to the sum of valuations of
goods she consumes. In this way, welfare of a poor consumer is equal to Me
R A
bM
tdG(t): From (3),
Me =
ILRA
bM
p(t)dG(t)
. This implies that
Wp = ILVC :
Welfare of a poor consumer naturally rises with an increase in either her income or the valuation to
price ratio of goods she consumes. Similarly, welfare of a rich consumer is given by
Wr = ILVC + (IH   IL)VE :
As the rich consume the same bundle of goods as the poor plus some others, welfare of the rich is
equal to welfare of the poor plus additional welfare from the consumption of "exclusive" goods, which
is in turn equal to income spent on these goods multiplied by their valuation to price ratio.
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Notice that all changes in individual welfare are divided into two components: an income e¤ect
and a price e¤ect. The price e¤ect is determined by changes in VC and VE , which implicitly depend
on the incomes (IH and IL) and the level of competition inside the groups of goods. The income e¤ect
is explicitly determined by changes in exogenous IL and IH :
3.2.2 Income Inequality
As income inequality in the economy, I consider the variance of the income distribution10, which is
given by
V AR = H(1  H) (IH   IL)2 : (5)
Income inequality is increasing in the income di¤erence IH   IL and has an inverted U shape as a
function of H . Since one of the comparative statics I analyze deals with xed aggregate income per
capita, I express the variance in terms of aggregate income per capita, the fraction of the rich, and
the income of the poor. Aggregate income per capita in the economy is given by
AG = HIH + (1  H)IL:
Then, the variance can be rewritten as follows
V AR = (
1
H
  1) (AG  IL)2 . (6)
The expression in (6) implies that keeping AG xed, an increase in IH together with a decrease in H
raise income inequality in the economy.
In the next sections, I examine the impact of income inequality on the market structure and
individual welfare. Since one of my main goals is to consider the e¤ects on welfare of the poor
consumers, in the subsequent analysis, I keep the income of the poor xed and only consider changes
in H and IH . Recall that while changes in H a¤ect consumer welfare only through the price e¤ect,
changes in IH a¤ect welfare through both the price and the income e¤ects.
3.2.3 Changes in the Income of the Rich
If the rich get even richer, do the poor gain or lose? What is the impact on prices? In this section, I
consider an increase in the income of the rich IH . Higher IH has an impact on the poor only through
10Another possible way to describe income inequality in the model is to use the Gini coe¢ cient. However, in the case
of the income distribution considered in the paper, the Gini coe¢ cient is highly correlated with the variance. Changes
in the parameters of the distribution, which increase the Gini coe¢ cient, usually increase the variance. The exception is
changes in H . In some cases, higher H decreases the Gini coe¢ cient but increases the variance. As my main goal is to
analyze the qualitative implications of changes in income distribution, without loss of generality, I consider the variance
of the distribution as the measure of income inequality.
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changes in the prices of the "common" goods. Two opposite e¤ects inuence these prices. First, since
IH increases, some rms that used to sell their goods to all consumers nd it more protable to sell
only to the rich. This reduces competition among rms serving all consumers and, therefore, raises the
prices of the "common" goods. Second, higher income of the rich results in higher expected prots of
rms, this in turn implies that more rms enter the market inducing tougher competition and reducing
the prices. I show that the latter e¤ect prevails over the former one. As a result, higher IH positively
a¤ects VC increasing welfare of the poor. The following proposition summarizes the results above.
Proposition 2 An increase in income of the rich reduces the prices of the "common" goods increasing
welfare of the poor.
Proof. In the Appendix.
In contrast, an increase in IH a¤ects the rich through both the price and the income e¤ects. Higher
income of the rich allows rms that sell only to the rich to raise their prices. In spite of higher entry
in the market, the prices of the "exclusive" goods rise and as a result, VE falls. However, the income
e¤ect is stronger than the e¤ect of changes in prices of the "exclusive" goods and the rich gain from
higher IH . The following proposition holds11.
Proposition 3 An increase in income of the rich raises the prices of the "exclusive" goods and in-
creases welfare of the rich.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The intuition, which is behind the results above, may also work in traditional models with homo-
thetic preferences. In Melitz (2003), higher income of some consumers results in higher entry, tougher
competition, and, thereby, higher welfare of all consumers. However, there are some di¤erences. In
the present model, higher income of the rich raises the markups of rms selling only to the rich and
decreases the markups of rms serving all consumers. In traditional models, there is the same or no
impact on rmsmarkups. Moreover, assume for a moment that the mass of rms does not change in
the model12. In this case, higher income of the rich raises prices of all goods and the poor are worse
o¤. In traditional models, if we x the mass of rms then higher income of one part of consumers does
not a¤ect welfare of the other part.
11Similar intuition works if we consider changes in IL: An increase in IL raises the prices of the "common" goods and
decreases the prices of "exclusive" goods. The poor and the rich are better o¤ (see details in the Appendix).
12 In some sense, this case can be interpreted as a short run version of the model.
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3.2.4 Changes in the Fraction of the Rich
In the previous section, I have established that higher income of the rich always benets the poor.
What is the impact of an increase in the fraction of the rich? What is better for the poor: tiny
minority or vast majority of the rich? In this section, I analyze how changes in H a¤ect the poor
consumers. As above, a rise in H a¤ects the poor through the price e¤ect. Because of higher H ,
prots from selling to the rich become higher. This implies that some rms switch from serving all
consumers to serving only the rich. This reduces competition among rms selling the "common" goods
and, consequently, raises the prices of the "common" goods. At the same time, higher fraction of the
rich results in higher ex ante expected prots and this in turn increases entry in the market inducing
tougher competition and lower prices of all goods. In the previous section, the negative e¤ect on the
prices of "common" goods always dominates the positive one. In this case, it is not necessarily true.
I show that in a neighborhood around H = 0, a rise in H increases welfare of the poor. While in
a neighborhood around H = 1, higher fraction of the rich decreases welfare of the poor consumers.
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 4 If H is close to zero (close to one), a rise in H decreases (increases) the prices of
the "common" goods increasing (decreasing) welfare of the poor.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The last proposition suggests that welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a function of
H . Because of mathematical di¢ culties arising in the analysis, I cannot strictly prove this conjecture.
Instead, I make a number of numerical exercises where I consider welfare of the poor as a function of
H . The results are supportive of the claim that welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a
function of H13.
The fact that rms endogenously choose the type of consumers they wish to serve makes the results
regarding changes in H di¤erent from that ones in traditional models with homothetic preferences.
In Melitz (2003), higher fraction of the rich always leads to higher welfare of the poor in the long run
and has no impact in the short run (when the mass of rms is xed). In this model, we observe an
13 It appears that the sign of (Wp)
0
H
is the same as the sign of K(H)  H1 H , where K(H) > 0 for any H 2 [0; 1]
and K(1) < 1. This implies that in the neighborhood of H = 0 (H = 1), (Wp)0H > 0 ((Wp)
0
H
< 0). If K(H) is
well behaved, i.e., the equation K(H) =
H
1 H has a unique solution, then Wp has an inverted U as a function of H .
Unfortunately, the analysis of the behavior of K(H) on [0; 1] is rather complicated. We cannot exclude the possibility
that the equation K(H) =
H
1 H has multiple solutions (see details in the Appendix). In the numerical examples I
consider, I take the power distribution G(b) =
 
b
A
k
with k > 0 as the distribution of draws. For a number of di¤erent
sets of the exogenous parameters, I nd the solution of K(H) =
H
1 H . In all cases, the solution is unique.
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ambiguous impact of H on the poor in the long run and a negative impact in the short run14.
3.2.5 Changes in the Income and the Fraction of the Rich Keeping Aggregate Income
Fixed
There is a common feature for both comparative statics mentioned above. An increase in IH as well
as an increase in H raises aggregate income in the economy. To capture a pure redistribution e¤ect,
I consider an increase in the personal income of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the
rich keeping aggregate income in the economy xed15. In models with homothetic preferences, these
changes in income distribution do not a¤ect entry, prices, and welfare of the poor. In the present
model, I show that they result in higher entry in the market and, therefore, higher welfare of the poor.
For better understanding of the intuition behind, I rst consider the short run implications of the
changes in income distribution. From the previous sections we know that in the short run, higher
IH decreases welfare of the poor, while lower H increases it. Thus, two e¤ects work in opposite
directions. However, it appears that the impact of IH is always stronger than that of H . Here the
assumption that aggregate income is unchanged plays a key role16. This implies that in the short run,
the poor are worse o¤ from the changes in the income distribution considered.
What is about the long run? On the one hand, higher income of the rich allows rms to impose
higher prices of their goods and, consequently, leads to higher entry in the market. On the other hand,
lower fraction of the rich reduces the demand for the "exclusive" goods making ex ante expected prots
14While a rise in H has an ambiguous impact on the poor, the rich always benet from it. Higher H raises competition
among rms selling the "exclusive" goods and, thereby, reduces the prices of these goods. Recall that welfare of the rich
is equal to Wr = ILVC + (IH   IL)VE . Even though in some cases VE falls, due to a rise in VC , Wr increases. As a
result, the rich gain from higher H . See details in the Appendix.
15Another comparative static that holds aggregate income constant is changes in incomes of the rich and the poor
keeping the fraction of the rich xed. Since the main goal of this paper is to explore the e¤ects on welfare of the poor,
I do not pay a lot of attention on this comparative static. If we consider a rise in IH and a decrease in IL holding AG
constant then we might expect that the income e¤ect prevails over the price e¤ect. That is, the rich gain and the poor
lose. Notice that the poor consume on average more valuable goods than the rich. At the same time, the changes in the
incomes substitute the consumption of more valuable goods for the consumption of less valuable goods. Therefore, given
that bg(b) is increasing in b, total welfare in the economy may decrease.
16Recall that welfare of a poor consumer is given by Wp = Me
R A
bM
tdG(t). Since in the short run Me is xed, we
only need to examine the e¤ects on bM . Notice that bM solves

b
VC
  c

L =

b
VE
  c

HL. This implies that
bM

1
VC
  H
VE

= c(1 H). From the goods market clearing condition, IL = MeVC
R A
bM
tdG(t) and IH IL = MeVE
R bM
bL
tdG(t).
This results in bM
Me
 
ILR A
bM
tdG(t)
  H (IH IL)R bM
bL
tdG(t)
!
= c(1   H). Notice that in the long run, both an increase in IH and a
decrease in aH drive the prices of the "exclusive" goods up (see the previous sections). This implies that in the long run,
bL = cVE falls. In the short run, only rms that were active before may operate in the market. Therefore, in the short
run, bL is unchanged. That is, rms that produced before the changes in IH and H nd it protable to produce after.
Moreover, as aggregate income in the economy is unchanged, H (IH   IL) does not change too. This implies that only
bM changes in
bM
Me
 
ILR A
bM
tdG(t)
  H (IH IL)R bM
bL
tdG(t)
!
. As a result, an increase in c(1  H) leads to a rise in bM .
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lower. This results in lower entry in the market. As in the previous section, I focus the analysis on
two extreme cases: H  0 and H  1. I show that in these cases, the impact of IH prevails over
that of H leading to higher entry in the market. Moreover, I show that the positive e¤ect on welfare
of the poor from higher entry is stronger than the negative short run e¤ect. These results are derived
for neighborhoods of H = 0 and H = 1 and an arbitrary distribution function G(b). However, if we
limit the analysis to the cases when bg(b) is increasing in b then the results hold for any H 2 [0; 1]17.
The next proposition summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 5 If H is in neighborhoods of H = 0 and H = 1 or G(b) is such that bg(b) is
increasing in b, an increase in IH together with a decrease H keeping aggregate income xed raise
welfare of the poor and the number of rms entering the market.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The assumption that bg(b) is increasing in b has a strong economic interpretation. It implies that
g(b) does not decrease too fast; i.e., the probability of getting higher values of b does not decrease
too fast with b. Moreover, in some sense, utility from the consumption of all goods with a particular
valuation b is equal toMebg(b). Hence, this assumption also guarantees that this utility increases with
b.
3.3 Entry Cost, Market Size, and Welfare
The impact of higher entry cost and market size on consumer welfare is the same as in traditional
models. However, the present model implies that changes in market size or the cost of entry have
di¤erent impacts on di¤erent types of consumers. In this section, I briey describe the e¤ects of
changes in fe and L on individual welfare and focus my analysis on the e¤ects on the relative welfare
of the rich with respect to the poor.
An increase in the cost of entry fe reduces the ex ante expected prots of rms. This in turn
decreases the number of rms entering the market and reduces competitive pressure. As a result,
prices of goods from both groups rise and welfare of all consumers falls. An increase in L results in
higher ex ante expected prots of rms. This leads to the higher number of rms entering the market
and tougher competition. Prices of goods from both groups fall and consumers of both types are
better o¤. Finally, any changes in fe and L such that the ratio
fe
L remains the same do not change
prices and individual welfare. Two opposite e¤ects completely compensate each other (see (4)). The
following proposition holds.
17For instance, the set of power distributions satises this condition.
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Proposition 6 Larger countries and countries with lower entry cost have higher individual welfare:
a rise in feL reduces welfare of all individuals.
Proof. In the appendix.
In the next section, I examine the e¤ect of feL on relative welfare of the rich with respect to the
poor.
3.3.1 Relative Welfare
Relative welfare of the rich with respect to the poor is given by
Wr
Wp
= 1 +
IH   IL
IL
VE
VC
:
Notice that welfare inequality is divided into two components: income inequality and consumption
inequality. The income inequality is determined by the ratio IH ILIL , while the consumption inequality
VE
VC
depends on relative prices of the "exclusive" goods with respect to the "common" goods. Changes
in the exogenous parameters of the model may a¤ect either type of inequality or both. For instance,
higher income of the rich raises income inequality but decreases consumption inequality.
The relative welfare can be rewritten as follows
Wr
Wp
= 1 +
IH   IL
IL

H + (1  H) bL
bM

: (7)
From (7), changes in feL a¤ect
Wr
Wp
only through the ratio bLbM . Moreover, changes in
fe
L have no direct
impact on the goods market equilibrium conditionR bM
bL
tdG(t)R A
bM
tdG(t)
  IH   IL
IL

H + (1  H) bL
bM

= 0: (8)
From (8), we can nd an implicit dependence of bM on bL: bM = bM (bL). Notice that
fe
L is negatively
correlated with the cuto¤ bL = cVE . Hence, exploring the impact of
fe
L on relative welfare, we need
to analyze the sign of

bL
bM (bL)
0
bL
. In the Appendix, I show that to determine the sign of

bL
bM (bL)
0
bL
,
we need to know the sign of

b2g(b)RA
b tdG(t)
0
b
. If

b2g(b)RA
b tdG(t)
0
b
is always greater than zero then

bL
bM (bL)
0
bL
is always positive. Otherwise, depending on the exogenous parameters of the model, the sign of
bL
bM (bL)
0
bL
might be either. The following proposition formalizes the ndings above.
Proposition 7 If

b2g(b)RA
b tdG(t)
0
b
> 0 for any b 2 [0; A], then the rich gain more from an increase in
market size and lose more from an increase in the cost of entry than the poor.
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Proof. In the Appendix.
Limiting the analysis to the cases when

b2g(b)RA
b tdG(t)
0
b
is always positive, we derive that the rich
lose more from an increase in feL than the poor. To understand the intuition, I separately consider
two markets. The rst market is the market for goods from the "common" group, while the second
one is the market for the "exclusive" goods. I divide the e¤ect of higher feL into two steps. First,
given an increase in feL , fewer rms enter the both markets decreasing bL and bM . Second, due to
less competitive pressure, some rms that sold their goods only to the rich switch to selling to all
consumers. This e¤ect decreases bM even more and in turn reduces competition in the second market
allowing rms with low valuations to survive. As a result, the cuto¤ bL falls. Since rms that switched
from the second market to the rst one have relatively high valuations of their goods compared with
rms that "survived", the prices of these goods were relatively high. This implies that bL has to fall
by more than bM to compensate for the di¤erence in the prices.
4 A General Model
To complete the model, I consider the general case with N types of consumers. I show the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium and discuss some issues related to the case when the distribution of
e¢ ciency units of labor among consumers is continuous.
In the general case, consumers di¤er in the number of e¢ ciency units of labor they are endowed
with. A consumer of type n is endowed with In e¢ ciency units of labor. I choose indices so that
In > In 1. Here n is the fraction of consumers of type n in the aggregate mass L of consumers. The
equilibrium in the general model is similar to the equilibrium in the simple case considered before.
All goods that are consumed by a certain type of consumers are also consumed by more productive
consumers. Thus, goods in the economy are divided into N + 1 groups. Goods belong to group
k = 1::N if they are only consumed by consumers whose type is greater or equal to k. Goods belong
to group N + 1 if they are consumed by nobody. In the equilibrium, goods from the same group
have the same valuation to price ratio. Let Vk be the valuation to price ratio of goods from group k.
Then, in the equilibrium, V (b) looks as in Figure 4, where bk is such that rms with bk are indi¤erent
between selling to consumers with types greater or equal to k and selling to consumers with types
greater or equal to k + 1. For instance, rms with b1 are indi¤erent between selling to all consumers
and selling to everyone except the poorest. Firms with b < bN leave the market. Without loss of
generality, I assume that rms with bk choose to sell to consumers with types greater or equal to k:
As before, let Me be the mass of rms that enter the market and draw valuation of their goods.
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Figure 4: The Valuation to Price Function: A General Model
-
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Denition 2 The equilibrium of the model is dened by the price function p(b) on b  bN , Me; the
sequences fVkgk=1::N and fbkgk=1::N such that
1) The ex ante expected prots of rms are equal to zero.
2) The goods market clears.
Let k(b) and pk(b) be the prot and the price of a rm with valuation b 2 [bk; bk 1), respectively18.
Then, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3 In the equilibrium,
pk(b) =
b
Vk
= bc
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k i
;
k(b) = cL
PN
i=k
i(b  bi)
bi
:
Proof. In the appendix.
In the equilibrium, the expected prots of rms are equal to zero. This implies that
fe =
PN
k=1(G(bk 1) G(bk))E(k(b)jb 2 [bk; bk 1)) ()
fe
cL
+ 1 =
PN
k=1 kH(bk):
In addition, the goods market clearing condition should be satised. This implies that the aggregate
cost of the bundle of goods from group k should be equal to income of a consumer of type k. In this
18b0 = A:
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way, I obtain
Ik =Me
Z A
bk
p(t)dG(t) k = 1::N:
Hence, there is the system of N + 1 equations
Ik =Me
R A
bk
p(t)dG(t) k = 1::N
fe
cL + 1 =
PN
k=1 kH(bk)
(9)
with N + 1 unknowns: fbkgk=1::N and Me.
Proposition 8 The equilibrium in the general model always exists and is unique.
Proof. The proof is based on the fact that the system of equations (9) has a unique solution. Details
are in the Appendix.
Assume that the distribution of consumer productivities is continuous. Notice that any continuous
distribution can be approximated by the sequence of discrete distributions. Therefore, we can interpret
equilibrium in the continuous model as the limit of equilibria in the discrete models. In this case, the
function V (b) is continuous, increasing on [bcL; b
c
M ), and at on [b
c
M ; A], where 0  bcL > bcM  A. The
parameter bcL represents the cuto¤ level: rms with b < b
c
L leave the market. While b
c
M is determined
by the support of the productivity distribution. Namely, goods with b 2 [bcM ; A] are consumed by
everybody in the equilibrium. This implies that bcM < A if and only if the lower bound of the
distribution support is strictly greater than zero; i.e., the minimum income in the economy is greater
than zero.
Due to mathematical di¢ culties, it is hard to solve the continuous model for an arbitrary distri-
bution of productivities19. To solve the problem explicitly, I need to make a simplifying assumption
about the distribution of e¢ ciency units of labor. I assume that this distribution has a constant
hazard rate. That is, I consider the set of exponential distributions on [s;1), where s  0 is the
minimum endowment of e¢ ciency units of labor. Since the upper bound of the support is innity, the
maximum income in the economy is also equal to innity. This implies that the cuto¤ bcL equals to
zero in the equilibrium. I show that in a neighborhood b = 0, the price function p(b) is decreasing in
b and p(0) =1. Hence, this model gives us a simple straightforward explanation of why some luxury
goods with relatively low valuation (or quality) to price ratios are so expensive: the rich are ready to
pay such high prices for these goods.
19See details in the Appendix.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous
rms and consumers. The model incorporates two key features: imperfect competition and non-
homothetic preferences, which allow us to analyze the consequences of changes in income distribution
on pricing, market structure and, thereby, welfare of di¤erent groups of consumers in equilibrium. The
general model is constructed and solved. Due to technical di¢ culties in exploring comparative statics
in the general case, I focus on the case of two types of consumers: rich and poor.
This framework leads to interesting theoretical results that help to understand the impact of income
inequality on individual well-being. In particular, I analyze how income inequality inuences welfare of
the poor. I show that higher income inequality in the economy may benet the poor via a trickle-down
e¤ect operating through entry. This model also allows us to analyze the e¤ects of changes in market
size and entry cost. An increase in market size leads to tougher competition. Therefore, markups
of all rms fall and welfare of all consumers rises. Similarly, an increase in entry cost induces lower
competition, raises markups, and, thereby, decreases welfare of all consumers. Moreover, I show that
the rich may gain more from an increase in market size and lose more from an increase in entry cost
compare to the poor.
There are a number of plausible extensions of this model. For instance, it would be interesting to
consider an open economy version of the model. In this case, the paper can be modied in two ways.
First, one can explore a model of trade between two countries with di¤erent income distributions and
examine how this di¤erence a¤ects the trade pattern. Second, it would be interesting to consider the
case when income distribution is endogenous and, for instance, a¤ected by the level of openness. I
leave these issues for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider R bM
bL
tdG(t)R A
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

: (10)
Let bM = F1(bL) be an implicit solution of (10). F1(bL) is strictly increasing in bL and A  F1(bL)  bL:
This implies that F1(A) = A. Now, consider
fe
cL
+ 1 = HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM ): (11)
By analogy, let bM = F2(bL) be an implicit solution of (11) : As H() is strictly decreasing, F2(bL)
is also strictly decreasing in bL: Since H(A) = 1, H(F2(A)) =
fe
cL(1 H) + 1 > 1. This implies that
F2(A) < A: Let bAL be such that F2(b
A
L) = A. Then, H(b
A
L) =
fe
cLH
+ 1 > 1, i.e., bAL < A. Hence, the
solution of (4) exists and is unique (see Figure 5 ).
Proof of Lemma 3
Demand for goods from group k is equal to L
PN
i=k i: From the denition of the sequence fbkgk=1::N ,
bk
Vk
  c
PN
i=k i =

bk
Vk+1
  c
PN
i=k+1 i. By induction,PN
i=k i
Vk
=
1
V1
  cPk 1i=1 ibi : (12)
Figure 5: The Equilibrium
-
6
A
0
bM
bLb
A
L A
F1(bL)
F2(bL)
24
From (12), N (b) =

b
VN
  c

NL =
bL
V1
  cbLPN 1i=1 ibi   cNL: Recall that N (bN ) = 0. This
implies that 1V1 = c
PN
i=1
i
bi
: From (12), 1Vk =
c
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k
i
k = 1::N . Therefore,
pk(b) = bc
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k i
;
k(b) = cL
PN
i=k
i(b  bi)
bi
:
Proof of Proposition 8
Using Lemma 3, the system of equations (9) can be rewritten as follows208><>:
fe
cL + 1 =
PN
k=1 kH(bk);
Ik Ik 1
cMe
=
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k
i
R bk 1
bk
tdG(t) k = 1::N
: (13)
Consider k = N . Then,
IN   IN 1
cMe
=
1
bN
Z bN 1
bN
tdG(t). (14)
Given Me and bN 1, there exists a unique solution bN (bN 1;Me) of the equation (14). The function
bN (bN 1;Me) is strictly increasing in Me and bN 1: Given bN 1, MebN (bN 1;Me) =
IN IN 1
c
R bN 1
bN
tdG(t)
is strictly
increasing in Me.
Consider k = N   1. Then,
IN 1   IN 2
cMe
=
N
bN
+
N 1
bN 1
N + N 1
Z bN 2
bN 1
tdG(t): (15)
Given Me and bN 2, there exists a unique solution bN 1(bN 2;Me) of the equation (15) : The func-
tion bN 1(bN 2;Me) is strictly increasing in bN 2: Since MebN (bN 1;Me) is strictly increasing in Me,
bN 1(bN 2;Me) is also strictly increasing in Me: Finally,

N
bN
+
N 1
bN 1

Me
N+N 1 =
IN 1 IN 2
c
R bN 2
bN 1 tdG(t)
is strictly
increasing in Me:
Using the backward induction, it can be proved that for any k = 1::N , there exists a unique
solution bk(bk 1;Me) of the equation
Ik Ik 1
cMe
=
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k
i
R bk 1
bk
tdG(t) such that bk(bk 1;Me) is strictly
increasing in bk 1 andMe. This implies that for anyMe, there exists a unique solution fbk(Me)gk=1::N
of the system of equations Ik Ik 1cMe =
PN
i=k
i
biPN
i=k
i
R bk 1
bk
tdG(t) k = 1::N: And for any k = 1::N , bk(Me) is
strictly increasing in Me: Hence, (13) is equivalent to fe
cL + 1 =
PN
k=1 kH(bk(Me));
bk = bk(Me) k = 1::N:
(16)
20I0 = 0:
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Consider D(Me) =
PN
k=1 kH(bk(Me)): As H(x) is a strictly decreasing function, D(Me) is strictly
decreasing in Me: If Me is close to zero then bN (Me) is close to zero and, thereby, D(Me) is high
enough21: If Me is su¢ ciently high then for any k = 1::N , bk(Me) is close to A and D(Me) PN
k=1 kH(A) = 1 <
fe
cL + 1: This implies that there exists a unique solution Me of (16) : Therefore,
there exists a unique solution of (9) :
Comparative Statics
In this section, I use a simplifying notation:
R y
x means
R y
x tdG(t):
Proof of Proposition 2
An increase in IH shifts the curve F1(bL) up, while the curve F2(bL) is unchanged. As a result, bL falls
and bM rises (see Figure 6 ). The impact on welfare of the poor is not so straightforward. Rewrite
(10) and (11) as follows
J1  (1  H)cLH (bM ) + HcLH (bL)  fe   cL = 0
J2  IL
R bM
bL
  (IH   IL)

H +
bL(1 H)
bM
 R A
bM
= 0
: (17)
21Recall that H(0) =1:
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Notice that equilibrium values of bL and bM solve (17). Using implicit di¤erentiation, I obtain
@bM
@IH
=
@J2
@IH
@J1
@bL
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
> 0 (18)
@bL
@IH
=
  @J2@IH
@J1
@bM
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
< 0: (19)
Consider 1VC =
Hc
bL
+ (1 H)cbM :

Hc
bL
+ (1 H)cbM
0
IH
is equal to  Hc
(bL)
2
@bL
@IH
  (1 H)c
(bM )
2
@bM
@IH
: From (18) and
(19),
 Hc
(bL)
2
@bL
@IH
  (1  H)c
(bM )
2
@bM
@IH
=
c2LH(1  H) @J2@IH
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL

H 0 (bM )
(bL)
2  
H 0 (bL)
(bM )
2

:
Recall that H 0(x) =  
R A
x tdG(t)
x2
< 0: Then,
 Hc
(bL)
2
@bL
@IH
  (1  H)c
(bM )
2
@bM
@IH
=
c2LH(1  H) @J2@IH
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
R A
bL
  R AbM
(bL)
2 (bM )
2 :
Since @J1@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
> 0 and @J2@IH < 0,

Hc
bL
+ (1 H)cbM
0
IH
< 0. Therefore, (VC)
0
IH
> 0: This
implies that an increase in IH leads to the lower prices of the "common" goods and higher welfare of
the poor, which is equal to ILVC :
5.0.2 Proof of Proposition 3
From the previous proof, we know that higher IH results in lower bL. That is, the prices of the
"exclusive" goods rise. As Wp =Me
R A
bM
and bM increases, an increase in IH raises Me and, therefore,
Wr =Me
R A
bL
:
5.0.3 Changes in IL
Similarly, an increase in IL shifts the curve F1(bL) down, while the curve F2(bL) is unchanged. Hence,
bL rises and bM falls. To analyze the impact on consumer welfare, I use the same technique as in the
previous proofs. As Wr =Me
R A
bL
and IH =Me
R A
bL
p(t)dG(t), Wr =
IH
RA
bLRA
bL
p(t)dG(t)
. The sign of (Wr)
0
IL
is
the same as the sign of
R A
bL
0
IL
R A
bL
p(t)dG(t) 
R A
bL
p(t)dG(t)
0
IL
R A
bL
: Algebra shows that
Z A
bL
0
IL
Z A
bL
p(t)dG(t) 
Z A
bL
p(t)dG(t)
0
IL
Z A
bL
=
=
c2L(1  H)2 @J2@IL
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
R bM
bL
R A
bL
R A
bM
(bL)
2 (bM )
2 + c(1  H)(bM   bL)

@bL
@IL
g(bL)
bM
Z A
bM
 @bM
@IL
g(bM )
bL
Z A
bL

:
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From (17), @bL@IL > 0,
@bM
@IL
< 0, and @J2@IL > 0. This implies that (Wr)
0
IL
> 0: As Me = WrR A
bL
, an increase
in IL raises Me and, thereby, Wp =Me
R A
bM
.
Proof of Proposition 4
An increase in H shifts the curve F1(bL) up and the curve F2(bL) to the right around 45 degree line
(see Figure 7 ). In this case, bM rises. The impact on bL is not so straightforward. There are two
opposite e¤ects. The upward shift of F1(bL) decreases bL, while the shift of the F2(bL) increases bL. I
show that @bL@H > 0.
From (17),
@bM
@H
=
  @J1@H
@J2
@bL
+ @J2@H
@J1
@bL
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
> 0
@bL
@H
=
  @J1@bM
@J2
@H
+ @J2@bM
@J1
@H
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
:
To determine the sign of @bL@H , I examine
  @J1
@bM
@J2
@H
+
@J2
@bM
@J1
@H
= cL
 
(H (bL) H (bM )) @J2
@bM
  (1  H)
(bM )
2 (IH   IL)

1  bL
bM
Z A
bM
2!
:
The partial derivative of J2 with respect to bM can be written as follows
@J2
@bM
= (IH   IL)
 
H +
bL(1  H)
bM

bMg (bM )
R A
bLR bM
bL
+
bL(1  H)
(bM )
2
Z A
bM
!
: (20)
28
Then,
  @J1@bM
@J2
@H
+ @J2@bM
@J1
@H
cL (IH   IL) = (H (bL) H (bM ))

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

bMg (bM )
R A
bLR bM
bL
+
+
(1  H)
(bM )
2
Z A
bM

G(bL)bL  G(bM )bL +
Z A
bL
 
Z A
bM

> 0;
as bM > bL and G(bL)bL  G(bM )bL +
R A
bL
  R AbM is increasing in bM and equal to zero when bM = bL:
Welfare of the poor is given by Wp =
IL
c

H
bL
+
(1 H )
bM
 : To determine the sign of (Wp)0H , we need
to examine the sign of

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
= 1bL   1bM  

H
(bL)
2
@bL
@H
+ (1 H)
(bM )
2
@bM
@H

: The derivative of J2
with respect to bL can be expressed as
@J2
@bL
=   (IH   IL)
0@bLg (bL)

H +
bL(1 H)
bM
 R A
bMR bM
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
Z A
bM
1A : (21)
Using the expressions (20) and (21), I show that
H
(bL)
2
@bL
@H
+
(1  H)
(bM )
2
@bM
@H
=
cL (IH   IL)

(H (bL) H (bM ))

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

P1 +

1  bLbM

P2

@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
;
where P1 =
 
HbMg(bM )
RA
bL
(bL)
2
R bM
bL
+
(1 H)bLg(bL)
RA
bM
(bM )
2
R bM
bL
+ (1 H)
bL(bM )
2
R A
bM
!
and P2 =
(1 H)H
(bM )
2(bL)
2
R bM
bL
R A
bM
: In addi-
tion,
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2@bM
@J1
@bL
cL (IH   IL) =

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

R bM
bL
P3 +
(1  H)
R A
bM
tdG(t)
(bM )
2 P4;
where P3 =
(1 H)bLg(bL)
RA
bM
2
(bM )
2 +
HbMg(bM )
RA
bL
2
(bL)
2 and P4 =
(1 H)
RA
bM
bM
+
H
RA
bL
bL
: Therefore,

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=
1
bL
  1
bM
 
(H (bL) H (bM ))

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

P1 +

1  bLbM

P2
H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
:
After some simplications,

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=

H +
bL(1 H)
bM


H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
P5;
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where
P5 =
(1  H)
R A
bM
(bM )
2
 
1
bL
+
bLg (bL)R bM
bL
! 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bL
!
+
H
R A
bL
(bL)
2
bMg (bM )R bM
bL
 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bM
!
:
Hence, the sign of

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
is the same as the sign of P5: As bM > bL, G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bL
<
0 and G(bM )   G(bL)  
R bM
bL
bM
> 0. Hence, if H is close enough to zero then

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
< 0;
that is, (Wp)
0
H
> 0. However, if H is close enough to one then

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
> 0. This implies
that (Wp)
0
H
< 0. It is much more complicated to determine the sign of P5 for all values of H 2 [0; 1].
5.0.4 The E¤ect of Higher H on the Rich
From the previous section, we know that @bL@H > 0. This means that higher H decreases the prices of
the "exclusive" goods. Welfare of the rich is given by 1c
 
IL
H
bL
+
(1 H )
bM
 + (IH   IL) bL
!
. This implies
c (Wr)
0
H
=
(IH   IL) @bL@H

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
2   IL HbL + (1 H)bM 0H
H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
2 :
To determine the sign of (Wr)
0
H
, we need to examine the sign of (IH   IL) @bL@H

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
2  
IL

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
. Using the previous results,
(IH   IL) @bL
@H

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
2
  IL

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=
= (IH   IL) @bL
@H

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
2
  IL

H +
bL(1 H)
bM


H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
P5:
After some simplications, it appears that to prove that (Wr)
0
H
> 0, it is enough to prove that
(IH   IL)

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM

(H (bL) H (bM ))  IL
bL
 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bM
!
> 0 ()
IL
R A
bL
bL
 
H (bL) H (bM )R A
bM
  1
bL
+
1
bM
!
> 0:
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For any bL < bM ,
H(bL) H(bM )RA
bM
  1bL + 1bM > 0 resulting in that (Wr)
0
H
is always greater than zero.
Since (Wr)
0
H
> 0, (bL)
0
H
> 0 and Wr = Me
R A
bL
; the mass of rms entering the market rises, i.e.,
(Me)
0
H
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 5
Aggregate income per capita AG is given by HIH + (1   H)IL. This implies that H (IH   IL) =
AG  IL. In this way, I rewrite (17) as follows

J1  (1  H)cLH (bM ) + HcLH (bL)  fe   cL = 0
J2  IL
R bM
bL
  (AG  IL)

1 + bL(1 H)HbM
 R A
bM
= 0
: (22)
Hence, it is necessary to explore the impact of a decrease in H on welfare of the poor given new
equilibrium equations (22). Using the same technique as in the proof of Proposition 4, I obtain

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0
H
=

H
bL
+ bL(1 H)bM
 (1 H) RAbM
b2M
(G(bM ) G(bL)) + P6


H+
bL(1 H )
bM
R bM
bL
tdG(t)
P3 +
(1 H)
RA
bM
(bM )
2 P4
;
where P6 =
(1 H)
RA
bM
b2M
b2Lg(bL)R bM
bL
 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bL
!
+
H
RA
bL
bL
bMg(bM )R bM
bL
 
G(bM ) G(bL) 
R bM
bL
bM
!
.
If H is close to one then P6 > 0 and

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
> 0: That is, welfare of the poor rises
with a decrease in H . This result is also supported by the fact that given su¢ ciently high H , both
an increase in IH and a decrease in H have a positive impact on welfare of the poor.
Consider

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H
when H is close to zero. From (22), limH!0 bL(H) = 0 and
limH!0
bL(H)
H
is a positive constant. As for any density function g(), limx!0 xg(x) = 0; limH!0 P6 >
0. This implies that

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0
H=0
> 0. Finally, it can be shown that if bg(b) is increasing in b,
(1 H)
RA
bM
b2M
(G(bM ) G(bL)) + P6 > 0 for any H 2 [0; 1].
Proof of Proposition 6
A rise in fe shifts the curve F2(bL) to the left, while the curve F1(bL) is unchanged. As a result, bL
and bM fall (see Figure 8). Since Wp =
IL
Hc
bL
+
(1 H )c
bM
and Wr = Wp +
IH IL
c bL, Wp and Wr decrease.
Me, which is equal to
WpR A
bM
, falls too. In the same way, a rise in L raises Me, Wp, and Wr. Finally, any
changes in fe and L such that
fe
L remains unchanged do not a¤ect F2(bL) and F1(bL):
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Proof of Proposition 7
I need to show that given

b2g(b)RA
b
0
b
> 0,

bL
bM (bL)

bL
> 0 where bM (bL) is an implicit solution of
Z bM
bL
 

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1  H)
bM
Z A
bM
= 0:
Notice that the sign of

bL
bM (bL)

bL
is the same as the sign of bM   @bM@bL bL. Algebra shows that
bM   @bM
@bL
bL > 0 ()
bLg(bL) +
R bM
bL
H+
bL(1 H )
bM
 (1 H)
bMRA
bLRA
bM
bMg(bM ) +
bL(1 H)
(bM )
2
R bM
bL
H+
bL(1 H )
bM

bL
bM
< 1 () (bL)
2 g(bL)R A
bL
<
(bM )
2 g(bM )R A
bM
.
The Continuous Distribution of E¢ ciency Units of Labor
I assume that there is a distribution F () on [s; S] (with a density function f()) of e¢ ciency units of
labor. That is, given the mass L of consumers, there are F (x)L consumers with income less or equal
to x. Dene V (b) = bp(b) . From the main body of the paper, V (b) is increasing on [b
c
L; b
c
M ) and at on
[bcM ; A] (see Section 4 ). I assume that V (b) is di¤erentiable on [b
c
L; b
c
M ). To simplify the notation, I
also assume that L = 1.
Consider a particular rm with valuation b. If b 2 [bcM ; A] then demand for this good is equal to
one and p(b) = bV (bcM )
. Suppose b 2 [bcL; bcM ) and the rm imposes price p of its good. Then, given V (b)
32
in the equilibrium, s+
R bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t) is total spending on goods, which are bought before the
good considered: goods that have higher valuation to price ratios. This implies that demand for this
good is equal to 1 F
 
s+
R bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t)
!
. Hence, in the equilibrium, rms with b 2 [bcL; bcM )
solve the following maximization problem
max
p
(p  c)
 
1  F
 
s+
Z bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t)
!!
:
The rst order condition implies that
1  F
 
s+
R bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t)
!
f
 
s+
R bcM
V  1

b
p
Mep(t)dG(t)
! = (p  c) bMep

V  1

b
p

g

V  1

b
p

p2V 0

V  1

b
p
 :
This equation should be satised for any b 2 [bcL; bcM ). That is, the price function p(b) on [bcL; bcM )
solves the following di¤erential equation
1  F

s+
R bcM
b Mep(t)dG(t)

f

s+
R bcM
b Mep(t)dG(t)
 = (p(b)  c) bMeg (b)
p(b)V 0 (b)
(23)
where V (b) = bp(b) : Using the solution of (23), free entry condition, and the goods market equilibrium,
we can nd bcL, b
c
M , and Me.
In general, it is rather complicated to nd the solution of (23). To simplify the problem, I assume
that F (x) = 1   e (x s) on [s;1): This implies that
1 F

s+
R bcM
b Mep(t)dG(t)

f

s+
R bc
M
b Mep(t)dG(t)
 = 1 :Thus, (23) is
equivalent to
V 0 (b) = Me (b  cV (b)) g (b) : (24)
As the maximum endowment of e¢ ciency unit of labor is innity, there is no exit and bcL = 0. Using
the initial condition V (0) = 0 and (24), we have
V (b) =
1
c

b  e MecG(b)
Z b
0
eMecG(t)dt

p(b) =
cb
b  e MecG(b) R b0 eMecG(t)dt :
From the goods market clearing condition, we obtain that s = MeV (bcM )
R A
bcM
tdG(t). Using this equation
and free entry condition, we can nd Me and bcM
22. Notice that limb!0 p(b) = 1. This means that
goods with the lowest valuations have the highest prices.
22 In the simplest case when s = 0, bcM = A and Me can be found from fe =
R A
0
(p(b)  c) e Me
RA
b p(t)dG(t)dG(b):
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